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THE RIGHT OF A D~~FAITLTING VENDEE TO
THE RESTITUTION OF INSTALl\fENTS PAID
THE question whether a vendee of land, ,vho defaults after hav-
ing ,paid one or more instalments of the price, can maintain an
action for the recovery of any part of such instalments, is but a
subordinate part of a larger problem. When can any contractor
who is himself in default get judgment for compensation for a
part performance rendered by 11im? It is a question of vital
import to building contractors, sellers and buyers of goods, em-
ployees who have quit service or have been discharged for cause,
as well as to vendees of land. In all these cases alike, there are
conflict and inconsistency and differences of opinion as to what
public policy and the general welfare require. The position of
the defaulting vendee, however, has generally not been consci-
ously related to the other types of cases.
In order to reconcile decisions, to eliminate actual conflict in
the future, and to construct a consistent system of law, it is
necessary to give more definite consideration to the equitable
rules against the enforcement of penalties and forfeitures. If
a contractor has committed a total breach of his contract, hav-
ing rendered no performance whatever thereunder, no penalty
or forfeiture will be enforced against him; he will be required
to do no more than to make the injured party whole by paying full
compensatory damages. In like manner, a contractor who com-
mits a breach after he has rendered part performance must also
make the injured party whole by payment of full compensatory
damages. The part performance rendered, however, may be
much more valuable to the defendant than the amount of the
injury caused by the breach; and in such case, to allow the in-
jured party to retain the benefit of the part performance so rend-
ered, without making restitution of any part of such value, is
the enforcement of a penalty or forfeiture against the contract-
breaker. In these cases the following questions should be plainly
* Townsend Professor of Law, Yale University; editor of ANSON, PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT (Am. ed.)
[1013]
Copyright, 1931 by the Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.
1014 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
put and definitely answered: Is a plaintiff who has partly per-
formed a contract to be penalized more strongly than one who
has not performed at all? Secondly, is a plaintiff who has al-
most fully performed his contract to be penalized more heavily
than one who has performed only a small part of the contract?
If a plaintiff in default is in no case to be given a restitutionary
remedy, and if he must forfeit his entire part performance for
nothing in return, whether that part is great or small, we are
answering the foregoing questions in the affirmative.
In this article, the cases involving the vendee's right of resti-
tution will be collected in considerable quantity; and an attempt
will be made to analyze and classify them in accordance with the
facts that were actually involved, as well as with the decision
and reasoning of the court ..
There are almost innulnerable cases dealing with the right of
a defaulting vendee to get restitution of instalments of the price
paid by him prior to the default. The facts in these cases are of a
very considerable variety? so that the right of restitution may
well exist in some but not in others. Cases granting restitution
and cases denying it can frequently be reconciled on reasonable
grounds. In statements of the law, however, this is generally
disregarded, the assumption being that all claims by a default-
ing vendee should be decided alike. On such an assumption as
this, it may be said that a very great majority of the cases have
refused restitution.
It has been thought by some that restitution should always be
refused, for the good and sufficient reason that the plaintiff is
one who is guilty of a breach of contract and should never be
allowed to have advantage from his own wrong; and cases are
numerous that lay down such a rule, even where there is no ex-
press provision for forfeiture.! It is true that he has broken his
1 Flagler v. Kroonen, 61 Cal. App. 359, 214 Pac. 1006 (1923); Beck v.
Swank, 55 Cal. App. 552, 203 Pac. 1010 (1922); Petersen v. Bunting, 43
Cal. App. 707, 185 Pac. 508 (1919); Wheeler v. Mather, 56 Ill. 241 (1870);
Ryan v. Shoenberger, 224 Ill. App. 308 (1922); Roberts v. Yaw, 62 Kan.
43, 61 Pac. 409 (1900); Frost v. Frost, 11 Me. 235 (1835); Nelson Real
Est. Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N. W. 227 (1920); Lowry v.
Robinson, 3 Neb. (Unoff.) 145,91 N. W. 174 (1902); Page v. McDonnell,
55 N. Y. 299 (1873); Toomey v. Sporn, 145 Okla. 38, 291 Pac. 22 (1930)
($1,000 down payment on an $18,000 purchase); Helm v. Rone, 43 Okla.
137, 138, 141 Pac. 678, 679 (1914),. "the rule is, without exception, that
where a party advances money in part performance of an executory con-
tract of sale, and afterwards breaches his contract, he cannot recover the
money paid;" Boyd v. McCullough, 137 Pa. 7,20 Atl. 630 (1890) ($811 paid,
out of $1,350). See extensive notes in L.R.A. 1918B 540, and 59 A.L.R. 189
(1929).
In Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 131, 140 (1881), the court refused to
give judgment for restitution of instalments paid by the vendee, saying:
"The defendant came by it rightfully; in pursuance of a contract lawfully
made, between competent parties. He has made no breach of that contract.
1931] RESTITUTION OF INSTALMENTS PAID 1015
contract; for, if his non-payment of the balance promised by
him is excused by the law, whether by the vendor's prior re-
pudiation or breach, or by failure of consideration due to no-
body's breach, or otherwise, all agree that he has a right of
restitution. Such cases are not within the present subject. It
is true, also, that the plaintiff's breach is a total breach-that
is, one that goes to the essence; for if it is a mere partial and
minor breach, it does not justify the vendor's refusal to convey,
and the vendee can get damages for such a refusal, as well as
the alternative remedy of restitution. But the right of a con-
tractor, who is himself vitally in default, to some compensation
of a restitutionary character, has been recognized and enforced
in too many thousands of cases to deny such a right to a vendee
merely because he is in default. As in other cases, we must
consider why he is in default, and the terms of the contract,
and the amount that he has paid, and the extent of injury that
his breach has caused.
Not infrequently it has been thought sufficient reason for
denying restitution that the express terms of the contract made
time of the essence and provided that, in case of default, all in-
stalments paid should be "forfeited" to the vendor or should be
"retained" by him as liquidated damages.2 But- here, too, factors
He has failed in no duty to the vendee. Wherefore, then, should he give
up that which was. rightfully his own? When and whereby did it cease
to be his and to- be due to the vendee? If the contract had been kept by
both parties, the money paid would still be his of right. The contract
would have been kept but for the breach of it by the vendee. . . . To
maintain this action would be to' declare that a party may violate his agree-
ment, and make an infraction of it by himself a cause of action. That
would be ill doctrine."
2 Hansbrough v. Peck, 72 U. S. 497 (1866); Public Industrials Corp. v.
Reading Hdw. Co., 29 F. (2d) 975 ( C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Glock v. Howard
& Wilson C. Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898); Skookum Oil Co. v.
Thomas, 162 Cal. 539, 123 Pac. 363 (1912); Hyman v. Harbor View Land
Co., 46 Cal. App. 98, 188 Pac. 828 (1920); Chubb v. J. Harker Chadwick
& Co., 93 Fla. 114, 111 So. 538 (1927); Bryson v. Crawford, 68 Ill. 362
(1873); Heckard v. Sayre, 34 Ill. 142 (1864); Chrisman v. Miller, 21 Ill.
227 (1'859); Stoddard v. Abercrombie, 46 Idaho 69, 266 Pac. 431 (1928);
Butler v. Cortner, 42 Idaho 302, 246 Pac. 314 (1926) (no recovery "at law,"
with suggestion that there might be "in equity," this being a civil action
in a code state); Papesh v. Wagnon, 29 Idaho 93, 157 Pac. 775 (1916);
Hawkins v. Robertson, 136 N. E. 576 (Ind. 1922); Miller v. Fletcher Say.
& T. Co., 78 Ind. App. 183, 133 N. E. 174 (1921); Krisky v. Bryan, 63 Ind.
App. 611, 115 N. E. 70 (1917); Converse v. Elliott, 200 Iowa 1023, 205
N. W. 867 (1925); Hamaker v. JohnEon, 199 Iowa 1298, 202 N. W. 10
(1925) ; Liewen v. Blau, 184 Iowa 327, 168 N. W. 811 (1918); Io"\va R. R.
Land Co. v. Mickel, 41 Iowa 402 (1875); Gamer v. Piper, 125 Kan. 395,
264 Pac. 1071 (1928); McCain v. Hicks, 150 La. 43, 90 So. 506 (1922);
Keefe v. Fairfield, 184 Mass. 334, 68 N. E. 342 (1903); Crenshaw v. Granet}
237 Mich. 367, 211 N. W. 636 (1927); Security Inv. Co. v. Meister, 214
Mich. 337, 183 N. W. 183 (1921); Maloy v. Muir, 62 Neb. 80, 86 N. W.
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enter in that are considered influential in other fields of law
and, in fact, are influential here. Penalties and forfeitures are
not favored; and calling an outrageous penalty by the more
kindly name of liquidated damages does not absolve it from its
sin. The absence of such all express provision, on the other
hand, has often been given as a reason for granting restitution.3
The cases stating that a vendee in default cannot have restitu-
tion of instalments, and also that an express provision for their
forfeiture is valid and enforceable, a're so numerous that such
statements are very generally regarded as existing law. They
ought to be so regarded only if the actual facts in these cases
are to be treated as immaterial, if other accepted principles of
law that are inconsistent with them are to be disregarded, and
if the various decisions that are in conflict with them are de-
clared to be erroneous.
VENDEE HAS NO RIGHT OF RESTITUTION WHILE VENDOR STILL HAS
RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
A contract for the sale of land differs in several material re-
spects from other contracts. It is almost invariably held to be
specifically enforceable at the suit of. either the. vendor or the
916 (1901)·; Patterson v. Murphy, 41 Neb. 818, 60 N. W. 1 (1894); Bev-
eridge v. West Side Const. Co., 130 App. Div. 139, 114 N. Y. Supp. 521 (1st
Dep't 1909) ; Kershaw v. Hurtt, 66 Okla., 117, 168 Pac. 202 (1917); Ander-
son v. Hurlbert, 109 Ore. 284, 219 Pac. 1092 (1923); Mitchell v. Hughes, 80
Ore. 574, 157 Pac. 965 (1916); Taylor v. Martin, 51 S. D. 536, 215 N. W. 695
(1927); Thiel v. Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 Pac. 1081 (1922); Palmer v.
Wash. Sec. Inv. Co., 43 Wash. 451, 86 Pac. 640 (1906) ; Jennings v. Horton,
43 Wash. 301, 86 Pac. 576 (1906); Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178, 38 Pac.
1003 (1894). See further AM. DIGEST SYSTEM, tit. "Vendor and Purchaser,"
Key No. 335.
3 Michigan Yacht Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906) ; Pierce
v. Staub, 78 Conn. 459, 62 Atl. 760 (1906); Gray & Co. v. McDaniel, 7'3 Ga.
118 (1884), also McDaniel v. Gray & Co., 69 Ga. 433 (1882); Giles v. Gullion,
13 Ind. 487 (18~9); Lloyd v. Davis, 2 Ind. App. 170, 28 N. E. 232 (1891);
Davis v. Wilson, 55 Ore. 403, 106 Pac. 795 (1910),; Dooley v. Stillson, 46
R. I. 332, 128 Atl. 217 (1925).
In Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 342, 218 Pac. 975, 979 (1923)t
which contains one of the best discussions of this subject, the court said:
"There is nothing in the contract, unless it can be read between the lines,
by which they agreed to forfeit payments on the purchase price. Equity
abhors a forfeiture, and the la'w' does not favor it. This is elen1entary; in
fact, it is axiomatic in every jUI'isdiction of the country, and we feel jus-
tified in propounding the question: Why should anything more than com-
pensatory damages be allowed in cases of this kind, especially where there
is no stipulation in the agreement upon which to base the allo,vance? It is
ordinarily considered oppressive and intolerable to enforce a forfeiture
amounting to punitive damages even where it is expressly agreed to by
the parties. A fortiori, such damages should not be awarded where they
are not expressly stipulated in the contract."
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vendee. Even before any deed of conveyance, the vendee is re-
garded as llaving some property interest in the land by virtue
of the'contract alone. Numbers of cases have held that he bears
the risk of loss through destruction of buildings on the land be-
fore conveyance and is bound to pay the full price for a proper
conveyance in spite of such destruction. 4 Even the cqurts that
decide otherwise as to this risk of loss do not doubt that the
vendee has a property interest by reason of the contract.5 The
vendor is often said to' hold the formal title merely as security
for the unpaid price, being, to some degree, in the same posi-
tion as a mortgagee. He can compel payment of the price in full
by a decree for specific performance, or he can foreclose his lien
on the premises, the proceeding operating like the foreclosure
or a mortgage.6
All this being true, it can be seen that there are special reasons
for refusing to allow the vendee to repudiate' the contract of
4 McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309,186 N. W. 74; (1921),22 A.L.R. 567
(1923); Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168,90 N. E. 430, 27 L.R.A. (N. s.)
233 (1910); Paine v. Meller, 6 Yes. 349 (1801); AMES, CASES IN EQUITY
(1909) 227, citing many cases. Contra: Durham v. McCready, 151 Atl.
544 (Me. 1930); Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134 (Mass. 1838).
5 See Richeimer v. Fischbein, 153 Atl. 514 (N. J. Eg. 1931), quoting from
Rose v. Watson, 10 H.L.C. 672, 683 (1864).
6 See Hansbrough v. Peck, supra note 2 (semble); Odd Fellows Say. Bank
V. Brander, 124 Cal. 255, 56 Pac. 1109 (1899) (60 days' time being allo\ved
for redemption by the vendee); Catterline V. Peterson, 60 CaL App. 617,
213 Pac. 515 (1923); Coe V. Bennett, 46 Idaho 62, 266 Pac. 413 (1928)
(strict foreclosure, and no restitution of sums paid); Dimon V. Wright,
206 Iowa 693, 214 N. W. 673 (1927), (same); Freeson v. Bissell, 63 N. Y.
168 (1875) (foreclosure by sale) ; Taylor v. Martin, 51 S. D. 536,215 N. \V.
695 (1927) (strict foreclosure with no restitution); Banks v. McQuatters,
57 S. W. 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), (same). In Anderson v. Hurlbert, 109
Ore. 284, 219 Pac. 1092 (1923), where the vendor tendered a conveyance,
the vendee was denied restitution but was given a stated time within which
to pay the balance due. There was an express forfeiture clause. In some
states this is a "strict foreclosure," vesting complete ownership in the
vendor; but mere often the decree' is for foreclosure by a sale of the prop-
erty. See AMES, Ope cit. supra note 4, at 226, citing many cases.
The Georgia court has said: "\Vhere the vendee has entered and made
improvements, or where he has paid a part of the purchase money, he has
acquired an interest in the land. This interest is property. He cannot be
deprived of such property except by virtue of some valid contract. It
cannot be done by way of penalty or forfeiture. In the sale of land on
credit, where the vendor retains title, he has not the absolute estate, but
is a trustee holding the title only as security. For many purposes the
transaction may be treated in equity as though the vendor had made a
deed to the vendee, and the latter had thereupon given a common-law mort-
gage to secure the purchase money. . . . As in a mortgage, so in its equit-
able equivalent, a conditional sale of land, a forfeiture will not be enforced
even for the vendee's default." Lytle V. Scottish-American Mortg. Co., 122
Ga. 458, 46'7, 50 S. E. 402, 406 (1905). See also Yost V. Guinn, 106 Kan.
465, 188 Pac. 427 (1920).
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purchase and to recover judgment for restitution of advance in-
stalments paid. Neither by a repudiation nor by mere failure
to pay other instalments, \V~hen due, can the vendee terminate the
vendor's right to payment of the full price-his right to specific
performance, his right as holder of a lien for the purchase price.1
As long as the vendor continues to assert these rights and to re-
main ready and willing to make conveyance as agreed, the de-
faulting vendee has no· right of restitution; he cannot recover
back money that he has paid if it is money that the vendor
could still compel him to pay if as yet unpaid.8 Some of the cases
denying restitution to the vendee can be justified on this reason-
ing, even though the court may not have used it and may not
have been conscious of its application.9 Few of them have been
based upon it in express terms; but not infrequently emphasis is
laid upon the fact that the'vendor has at all times been ready and
\villing to perform as agreed.10 This should be considered in
connection with those cases that allow restitution in case the
vendor has declared the contract "rescinded."
1 The vendor rnay still enforce specific performance after an unsuccessful
suit by the vendee to get restitution of an instalment paid. Nass v. MUD-
zing, 100 N. J. Eq. 421, 136 Atl. 344' (1927).
8 Bradford v. Parkhurst, 96 Cal. 102,30 Pac. 1106 (1892). See also Kyger
v. Caudill, 115 Okla. 102, 241 Pac. 814 (1925). The vendor can get judgment
for instalments due, remaining himself ready and willing to convey as agreed,
and in such case the vendee has no right to money back. Chace v.. Johnson,
98 Fla. 118,123 So. 519 (1929); Meagher v. Hoyle, 173 Mass. 577, 54 N. E.
347 (1899); Brown v. Norcross, 59 N. J. Eq. 427, 45 At!. 605 (1900),;
Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 398 (N. Y. 1822); Lea v. 'Bleckland, 122
Ore. 230 t 25'5 Pac. 801 (1927). The vendor's continued willingness and
ability to convey will prevent restitution of instalments, even though for
some independent reason the remedy of specific performance is not available
to hint. Keystone Hdw. Corp. v. Tague, 246 N. Y. 79,158 N. E. 27 (1927).
In Nasha Holding Corp. v. Ridge Bldg. Corp'., 221 App. Div. 238, 223 N. Y.
Supp. 223 (2d Dept. 1927), the vendor, when sued for a down payment,
successfully counterclaimed for specific performance.
9 In Hansbrough v. Peck, supra note 2, the vendor had previously obtained
a decree for specific enforcement of the contract. Also in Mintle v. Syl-
vester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N.W. 367 (1927).
10 See Utterbach v. Binns, Fed. Cas. No. 16,809, 1 McLean 242 (C.C.D.
Ky. 1834); Walbridge v. Richards, 290 Pac. 304 (Cal. App. 1930) (deposit
of $1,000 on a $15,000 contract, "the vendor being ready, able, and willing
to perform upon his part"); Nance v. Avenall, 26 Cal. Pac. 551, 147 Pac.
583 (1915); List v. Moore, 20 Cal. App. 616, 129 Pac. 962 (1912); Roberts
v. Yaw, 62 Kan. 43,61 Pac. 409 (1900) (down payment of $290 on a $1,000
contract, the vendor always tendered performance, even in court); Smith
v. McMahon, 197 Mass. 16, 83 N. E. 9 (1907); Pioneer Gold Mining Co.
v. Price, 189 Mo. App. 30, 176 S. W. 474 (1915); Gallagher v. Dettelbach,
25 Ohio C. C. 342 (1903) (down payment of $300 on a $2,475 contract) ;
Beatty v. Wintrode Land Co., 53 Okla. 118, 155 Pac. 574 (1916); Snyder
v. Johnson, 44 Okla. 388, 144 Pac. 1035 (1914) ($1,000 paid down on a
$13,000 contract) ; Helm v. Rone, supra note 1; Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162,
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RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT AND ITS EFFECT IN CREATING
A RIGlIT OF RESTITUTION
In order to avoid the supposed rule that a plaintiff in default has
no right of restitution, the courts have often fortunately discov-
ered a "rescission" of the contract, \vithout Inaking any distinc-
tion between rescission by mutual assent and that kind oJ uni-
lateral rescission that consists merely in a declaration of free-
dom by the injured vendor ,vhile loudly asserting all of his own
rights under the contract. Some consideration of what is meant
by the word "rescission" is here necessary.
In the first place, it is clear that the vendee's own breach is
not a rescission in any sense. It is equally clear that he cannot,
by his o\vn breach alone, create a right of any kind against the
innocent vendor. If, in spite of the breach, the vendor continues
to insist upon specific performance and remains ready and \vill-
ing to convey as agreed, the vendee certainly has no right to
any part of his money back. But, generally, the vendor does
not insist upon specific performance and does not remain ready
and willing to convey. His action, along with the other exist-
ing facts, may make it unjust for him to retain all of the money
paid.
Let us first consider rescission of the contract by mutual assent
of the two parties. A breach of contract is not an offer to re-
scind, but either party may make such an offer; and if he does
so, the other has power of acceptance. The validity of such an
agreement is determined in accordance with the same rules as
in the case of other contracts. If there has been an effective
rescission by mutual assent, neither party is any longer in de-
fault if he ever was. The mutual rights of the parties will usu-
ally be determined by the terms of the rescission agreement.
Sometimes, however, the agreement makes no provision at all
with respect to instalments already paid or any other part per-
formance rendered. In such cases, there is a right to the resti-
tution of such instalments, making due allowance for benefits
received by the vendee, but with no deduction of damages for a
breach. In a few of the cases that award restitution to the ven-
dee, there may have been such a rescission as this.!!
There is a second kind of "rescission," one that has caused a
99 Pac. 666 (1909) (down payment of $500 on a $3,500 contract); Wood-
man v. Blue Grass Land Co., 125 Wis. 489, 103 N. W. 236 (1905), rehearing
denied 104 N. W. 920 (1905) (express forfeiture of $1,000 earnest money
on a $31,500 contract).
11 See King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho 223, 118 Pac. 292 (1911); Baston v.
Clifford, 68 Ill. 67 (1873); Wright v. Swigart, 172 Iowa 743, 154 N. W.938
(1915) (the court labored to find a "mutual abandonment"); Reiger v.
Turley, 151 Iowa 491, 131 N. W. 866 (1911); Hurley v. Anicker, 51 Okla.
97, 151 Pac. 593, L.R.A. 1918B 538 (1915).
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good deal of confusion of thought. This is rescission by the act
of the vendor alone, not as an acceptance of an offer by the
vendee, but as a remedy for the vendee's breach of contractu The
words and acts of the vendor in so "rescinding~' may be of
various kinds; but they are never "I accept your offer to rescind."
Instead, the vendor may say: "I rescind the contract for your
breach;" or "I declare the contract at an end and your rights
terminated." At the same time, ·he mayor he may not assert the
forfeiture of instalments paid or make a claim for damages.
Again, he may say nothing at all to the vendee, but may merely
proceed to sell the land to some one else. The effect of such
words or action by the vendor is not the same as the effect of
a rescission by mutual assent. The validity and operation of
such a rescission depend upon its terms and upon the fact that
the parties have both assented tllereto. "Rescission" by one
party for breach by the other party, on the other hand, is not
an agreement and has no terms; and there are no mutual ex-
pressions of assent.12
The effect of this second kind of "rescission" by a vendor is
as follows: It is an assertion of his own privilege not to per-
form further, a privilege that was already created, however, by
the vendee's breach, and is not created by his assertion of it. Its
legal operation consists of the fact that it extinguishes the ven-
dor's own right to specific performance, thus also extinguishing
the vendee's interest in the land and restoring to the vendor his
full property interest as it existed prior to the making of the
contract. These effects would not follow upon the vendee's
breach alone. Furthermore, it may perhaps create a right of
restitution in the vendee; but it does not extinguish the vendor's
right to damages for the breacll.13
12 In Malmberg v. Baugh, supra, note 3, at 337, 218 Pac. at 977, the court
well understood that there had been no rescission by mutual assent. The
court said: "Was there a mutual rescission as matter of law? If so, it
must be upon the theory that, when a vendee defaults and the vendor for
that reason terminates the contract, it amounts to a rescission entitling
both parties to be put in statu quo. ... In the cases cited by appellant
in which the vendee wa~ permitted to recover for payments on the purchase
price, the courts also generally find there was a rescission of the contract,
but 'in many of them, when carefully analyzed, it will b~ found there was
no' rescission at all, unless we concede that the facts and circumstances
of the instant case amount to a rescission. The fact is that the rule con-
tended for by respondent, that a defaulting vendee cannot recover for pay-
ments made on the purchase price when the vendor is without fault, has
been so manifestly unjust and oppressive in many cases that courts in
order to mete out justice to a defaulting vendee have placed a strained
construction upon the conduct of the vendor and denominated it a 'rescis-
sion,' when such holding was hardly justified under the law as applied
to the facts." The court held that the vendee in this case was entitled to
restitution.
1~! Cases holding that he has no right to damages must generally be
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As has been said previously, the vendee can have no right of
restitution as long as he still has his purchaser's interest in the
land and the vendor still has his right to specific performance
of the balance. But now that the vendor has terminated these,
the question of restitution may properly arise. There are cases
holding that the vendee has a right to restitution of instalments
paid if the vendor has thus "rescinded"; 14 and there are other
cases refusing restitution· on the ground that there has been no
"rescission." 1~ In both kinds of cases it may not be at all clear
regarded as in error. The vendee should never be given restitution of all
instalments paid, without a deduction for injury done. Damages were
awarded to the vendor in spite of such a Hrescission" by him in Malmberg
v. Baugh, s'upra note 3.
14 Chandler v. Wilder, 215 Ala. 209, 110 So. 306 (1926); Phelps v. Brown,
95 Cal. 572, 30 Pac. 774 (1892) ($500 paid "as a forfeit" was recovered in
spite of vendee's default because the vendor then "abandoned the trade") ;
Drew v. Pedlar, 87 Cal. 443, 25 Pac. 749 (1891); Lytle v. Scottish-Amero
rtlortg. Co., supra note 6; Blitch v. Edwards, 96 Ga. 606, 24 S. E. 147
(1895) (after vendee's default, the vendor ejected him by process of law) ;
McDaniel'v. Gray & Co., supra note 3; Gilbreth v. Grewell, 13 Ind. 484
(1859); Waters v. Pearson, 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. 'V. 1026 (1914); Norris
v. Letchworth, 167 Mo. App. 553, 152 S. W. 421 (19~2); Malmberg v.
Baugh, supra note 3; McGreevy v. Hodder, 4 Onto W. N. 536, 8 D.L.R.
755 (1912).
In Pierce v. Staub, supra note 3, where the vendee defaulted after paying
$60,000 out of a total of $150,000, the court gave judgment for restitution
of the money so paid, on the theory of "rescission," although clearly there
was no mutual assent to rescind. Here the court employed the fiction of
a mutual rescission in order to avoid an inequitable forfeiture, \vhich, as
the court said, "equity abhors and the la\v does not favor." In Howard
v. Stillwagon, 232 Pa. 625, 628, 81 Atl. 807, 808 (1911),. the vendee got
judgment for instalments paid in advance, the vendor having ousted him
from possession of the land. The court said: "The rights of each of the
parties must be found in the agreement, and, in the absence of anything
therein authorizing the appellees to treat as forfeited to them the purchase
money \vhich the app211ant paid them, andi which they accepted fronl him
before they undertook to rescind after they had the right to do so, their
claim to retain it is no more favored by the law than in equity. Even if
they had resold the property at a loss, thE~y could not have retained out
of the Moneys paid then1 by the appellant more than sufficient to reimburse
them for the loss sustained."
15 Golly v. Grinnell ColI. Found., 204 Iowa 319, 213 N. W. 252 (19~7')
("the contract was terminated by forfeiture and not by rescission");
Downey v. Riggs, 102 Iowa 88, 70 N. \V. 1091 ( 1897) (instalments not
recoverable if vendor has not rescinded or refused to complete) ; Hansehild
Y. Stafford, 25 Iowa 428 (1868); Steinbach v. Pettingill, 67 N.J .L. 06, 50
Atl. 443 (1901) (no recovery if vendor is ready and willing to complet~) ;
Keystone Hdw. Corp. v. Tague, supra. note 7 (the vendor was ready and
willing to convey, and he counter~laimed for specific perforn1ance, the
denial of this remedy not being based on any inability or unwillingness) ;
Kershaw v. Hurtt, 66 Okla. 117, 168 Pac. 202 (1917); Lea v. Blockland,
122 Ore. 230, 257 Pac. 801 (1927) (buyer asked relief from the contract,
the defendant remaining ready and willing to perform); Hathaway v.
Hoge, 1 Sadler 119, 1 Atl. 392 (Pa. 1885).
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whether the court meant a rescission by mutual assent or a
"rescission" by the action of the vendor alone as a remedy for the
vendee's breach. In some cases involving the second kind of
"rescission," the court has seen the difference and has attempted
to distinguish other cases on the ground that in them there had
been a rescission by mutual assent. 16 This attempt is a failure,
however, because the facts of the cases so classified generally
justify no such distinctIon 'I Still other cases clearly recognize
the distinction and refuse restitution of payments if the only
rescission is the vendor's recognition of the vendee's default as
a total breach and his assertion of his privilege of retaining
both the land and the instalments paid.17
In a most instructive case,18 the Georgia court recognized that
16 In Winter v. Kitto, 100 Cal. App. 302, 309, 279 Pac. 1024, 1026 '(1929),
the court says: "It has been held that, after the vendee's breach, the vendor
may agree to a mutual abandonment or rescission, in which case the vendee
would be entitled to recover the amounts paid. Such were the facts proved
or admitted in the following cases wherein recovery was allowed. [Ten
California cases are cited.] The court further says: "But a vendee in
default cannot recover where the vendor who is not in default stands upon
the contract; and the right to retain the purchase money upon an unex-
cused default by 'ihe vendee is independent of any express clauses in the
contract for the forfeiture of rights or the retention of payments as liquid-
ated damages, suoh clauses being but declarations of what would have been
the legal rights of the vendor without such provisions." In this case there
was an express provision for forfeiture of instalments paid in case of
default by the vendee; and a breach having occurred, the vendor gave notice
that the 'contract was cancelled and of no effect. The court held that this
was not a rescission, but merely an election to enforce the express terms
of the contract, and that the vendee could not recover the instalments paid.
The' plaintiff had paid $600, the full purchase price being ~,OOO.
11 List v. Moore, 8upra note 10; Glock v.Howard & Wilson C. Co., 123
Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898); Todd v. Collier, 53 Ind. 122 (1876); Mintle v.
Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N. W. 367 (1926) ; McLain v. Smith, 201 Iowa
89, 202 N. W. 239 (1925) ; Pioneer Gold Mining Co. v. Price, 189 Mo. App. 30,
176 S. W. 474 (1915); Battle v. Rochester City Bank, 3 N. Y. 88 (1849),
aff'g 5 Barb. 414 (N. Y. 1848) ; Snyder v. Johnson, 44 Okla. 388, 144 Pac.
1035 (1914). In the case of King v. Milliken, 248 Mass. 460, 143 N. E. 511
(1924), the court held that the buyer who had wrongfully repudiated the
contract could not maintain suit for the recovery of the deposit of $500. It
held further that the fact that the vendor had subsequently made a lease of
the premises after the vendee's repudiation did not constitute a rescission.
This was acquiescence in the finality of the vendee's repudiation, but it was
not the acceptance of an offer of rescission, and it created no right in the
vendee to the return of his deposit~
Bozeman v. Curtis, 291 Pac. 870,871 (Cal. App. 1930) : "Where the vendee
is in default and the vendor is not, the latter is not liable for the purchase
money unless there has been a mutual rescission of the contract. The notice
of termination was not a notice of rescission because it expressly declared
that the payments would be held forfeited in accordance with the contract.
Rescission is itself a contract subject to the same rules of interpretatio~.
An essential element is intent. Here the notice negatives intent to rescind."
18 Lytle v. Scottish-American J\Iortg. Co., supra note 6.
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by the express terms of the contract the vendor had a power of
"rescission" for the vendee's breach; but it refused to enforce
the ironclad provisions for forfeiture and it granted equitable
relief to both parties. The vendor was not allowed both to
"rescind" and to forfeit; he could not have both the land with
its improvements and the part of the price that had been paid.
VENDEE HAS NO RIGHT OF RESTITUTION UNLESS PAYMENTS
EXCEED THE VENDOR'S INJURY
If the vendor has exercised his power created by the vendee's
breach and has terminated the vendee's property interest and
also his own right to specific performance, must he give back
any part of the payments already received? This question re-
quires the consideration of two more matters: First, the pro-
portion that these payments bear to the amount of injury suffered
by the vendor; and secondly, the effect of an express provision
in the contract that, in case of breach by the vendee, the vendor
may retain some or all of the payments made. First, is there
any unjust enrichment? Secondly, does the contract make a
valid liquidation of d'amages or does it prescribe a penalty or
forfeiture?
Whether the vendor has "rescinded". for the vendee's breach
or not, and whether there is an express provision for forfeiture
or not, it is clear that the vendee in default should in no case
be given restitution of money paid unless it affirmatively appears
that the money so paid is in excess of the injury caused to the
vendor by the breach.. The vendee sues because h~ asserts that
retention of the money is unjust enrichment; but there is no
injustice if the defendant is retaining no more than the amount
of injury caused by the plaintiff's breach. In cases where the
plaintiff may have a right of restitution, he should be permitted
to show that the defendant's injury is less than the instalments
paid; but unless he successfully shows this, he should recover
nothing.
In very many of these instalment cases, the amount actually
paid by the plaintiff, for the restitution of which he sues, was
a s~all amount in comparison with the entire contract price.
Sometimes it was merely a first instalment or earnest money.19
19 Public Industrials Corp. v. Reading Hdw. Co., 29 F. (2d) 975 (C.C.A.
3d, 1929) (down payment of $~OO,OOO, out of a total price of $3,900,000) ;
Nourse v. Azvedo, 185 Cal. 47, 195 Pac. 669 (1921) (initial payment of only
$200, no evidence as to amount of defendant's injury); Skookum Oil Co.
v. Thomas, 162 Cal. 539, 123 Pac.' 363 (1912) ($20,000 paid, the total being
$40,000, but the vendee took possession and drilled for oil); Glock v.
Howard & Wilson C. Co., supra note 17 ($382 paid out of a total of $1,000,
with no proof as to extent of defendant's injury, the court thinking the
express provision for retention to be a liquidation of damages); Winter
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In such cases, it is unlikely that the amount retained by the
vendor was greater than the injury suffered by the plaintiff's
v. Kitto, 100 Cal. App. 302, 279 Pac. 1024 (1929) ($600 out of total of
$4,000) ; List v. Moore, supra note 10 ($5,000 paid out of $25,000) ; Young
v. Jordan, 183 Ill. 459, 56 N. E. 85 (1899) ($1,000 paid, total of $11,000) ;
Mintle v. Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N. W. 367 (1926) ($35,000 paid out
of $140,000) ; Wolf v. Lake, 178 Ill. App. 340 (1913)· ($150 "earnest money,"
total of $6,900); Cody v. Wiltse, 130 Iowa 139, 106 N. W. 510 (1906) (first
instalment only); Downey v, Riggs, 102 Iowa 88, 70 N. W. 1091 (1897)
(first instalment $100); Long v. Clark, 90 Kan. 535, 135 Pac. 673 (1913)·
($400 on a total of $2,200); Hillyard v. Banchor, 85 Kan. 516,118 Pac. 67
(1911) ($100 out of $1,500, the court finding no "equity" in the plaintiff) ;
Ward Real Estate v. Childers, 223 Ky. 302, 3 S. W. (2d) 601 (1928) (ten
per cent earnest money retained); Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Me. 454 (1827)
(plaintiff had paid only $10 out of $130); Chertok v. Kassabian, 255 Mass.
265, 151 N. E. 108 (1926) (:fir~t deposit only) ; King v. Milliken, 248 Mass.
460, 143 N. E. 511 (1924) ($500 down, out of $8,000); Garcin v. Pennsyl-
vania Furnace Co., 186 Mass. 405, 71 N. E. 7'93 (1904); Malone v. Levine,
240 Mich. 222, 215 N. W. 356 (1927) ($5,000 down payment on a lease for
10 years at total rental of $210,000) ; Monahan v. Addy, 176. Minn. 50, 222
N. W. 88 (1928) ($200 "earnest money" out of $7,000) ; True v.Northern
Pacific Ry., 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W. 948 (1914) (one-sixth of the p~ce) ;
Massey v. Butts, 204 Mo. App. 55, 221 S. W. 153 (1920) ($1,000 paid out of
$19,000); Dooley v. Kushin, 105 N.J.L. 595, 146 Atl. 208 (1929) ($15,000
paid, total price $1,150,000) ; Page v. McDonnell, 55 N. Y.299 (1873) ($2,-
000 paid, whole price $49,000); Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609, 79 Atl. 772
(1911) (vendor had resold the land at an advance, but it did not appear how
long he had been delayed or what expense had been incurred; and the plain-
tiff had paid only $2,000 out of $104,000) ; Vanity Fair Co. v. Hayes 31 R. I.
77, 76 Atl. 771 (1910) ($5,000 paid, 'total of $40,000); Taylor v. Martin, 51
S. D. 536, 215 N. W. 695 (1927) (first instalment of $4,100, total price $22,-
000) ; Joyce v.Hagelstein, 163 S. W. 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) ($500 "ear-
nest money," total price $8,000) ; Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 Pac. 666
(1909) ($500 out of $3,500) ; Bock v. Celleyham, 100 Wash. 545, 171 Pac. 525
(1918) ($2,000 down payment out of $10,000) ; Howe v. Smith, 27 Ch. D. 89
(1884) (£500 as a deposit, the full price being £12,500). In Ketchum v.
Evertson, 13 Johns. 359 (N. Y. 1816), a vendee of land sued for restitution
of $7'00 paid by him on account of the price. He had, without any sufficient
justification, repudiated the contract and refused to make any further pay-
ments. The court gave judgment for the defendant, saying: "It may be as-
serted, with confidence, that a party who has advanced money, or done an act
in part performance of an agreement, and then stops short, and refuses to
proceed to the ultimate conch,lsion of the agreement, the other party being
ready and willing to proceed and fulfill all his stipulations, according to the
contract, has never been suffered to recover for what has been thus advanced
or done." But the facts in this case showed that the defendant received
a much lower price on the second' sale, so that the injury caused him by
the plaintiff's breach was in fact more than $700. In Hansbrough v. Peck,
supra note 2, the court held that the vendee had no right of restitution.
In this case, however, the vendor had previously obtained a decree in chan-
cery for the enforcement of the contract. In that proceeding the vendee
ought to have asked for restitution if the facts entitled him to any. Instead
of so doing, however, he brought a subsequent action for restitution. With
respect to the amounts involved, the court says: "Of the $93,000 purchase-
money, they have paid only $10,000; of interest, some $28,000. They
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breach. Whatever the amount, the plaintiff must show that it
is greater than the injury done.20 In most cases that injury is
wholly unliquidated and difficult of accurate estimation; and in
few cases does the plaintiff attempt to show how much it was.
The defendant is not resting merely on the "letter of his bond;"
he is an injured party, from whom a wrongdoer is asking the
court to take money. The plaintiff has no bond upon which to
rest, either in letter or in spirit. He is asking for justice. The
very justice that he seeks requires him to make reparation for
his wrong and, before awarding judgment, requires him to show
that retention by the defendant is unjust. 21 -
In some cases, however, the instalments paid are large in
comparison; and sometimes the plaintiff in fact shows or offers
to sho,v that the injury is less. In cases like this, the plaintiff
should not be denied the opportunity to prove what he asserts,
although often his evidence may be so indefinite and uncertain
that it should be thrown out. If he can and does show by proper
evidence that the defendant is holding an amount of money as
expended for improvements $18,000. There still remained due against them
$83,000 purchase-~oney and over $20,000 interest, at the time the vendor
went into possession. The plaintiffs themselves had been in the possession
and enjoyment of the premises for a period exceeding that for which the
interest on the purchase-money had been paid, which, at least, must be
regarded as an equivalent for the money thus paid." On this showing it
does not appear that the defendant's enrichment was more than his injury.
20 Stennick v. Jones, 252 Fed. 345 (C.C.A. 9th, 1918)· ("the damages
which the appellees have suffered seem to have been considerably greater
than the value of the property forfeited"); ~ytle v. Scottish-Amer. Mortg.
Co., supra note 6; Osterhout v. Brandts, 114 Kan. 537,220 Pac. 171 (1923)
(restitution denied because not more than defendant's injury) i Sandusky
v. Waller, 272 S. W. 1045 (Mo. App. 1925)· (the damages to defendant
having exceeded the amount of the money that had been paid to him by
plaintiff, the decree was undoubtedly for the right party); Harrington v.
Eggen, 51 N. D. 87, 199 N. W. 447 (1924) (payment of only $5,000 out of
a total price of $67,500, and the land had depreciated in value); Dluge v.
Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 141 At!. 230 (1928) (stock of merchandise was
resold at an advance by the vendor, but the court said that the vendee was
"endeavoring to take advantage of the defendant's labor and skill in selling
the goods without compensating him therefor") ; Hathaway v. Hoge, 1 Atl.
392 (Pa. 1885) (plaintiff had paid over half of the agreed price but had
also operated oil wells on the land); Burton v. Ryther, 38 S. D. 342, 141
N. W. 350 (1917) ("the court found that the defendant had suffered
damages sufficient in amount to offset the amounts that had been paid and
expended by the plaintiff under the contract") ; Pierson v. Dorff, 198 'Vis.
43,223 N. W. 579 (1929) (vendor's injury greater than the amount paid) ;
Quinlan v. St. John, 28 Wyo. 91, 201 Pac. 149, 203 Pac. 1088 (1922) (rental
value of land occupied by plaintiff may have exceeded the instalments paid,
burden of proof being on the plaintiff). In Beveridge v. West Side Constr.
Co., 130 App. Div. 139, 114 N. Y. Supp. 521 (1st Dep't 1909), the vendee
showed that the injury was much less than the instalments, but the court
enforced the forfeiture.
21 Lipscomb v. Fuqua, 103 Tex. 585, 131 S. W. 1061 (1910).
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a penalty rather than as compensation for injury, he should be
given judgment for restitution of that amount. 22
It should in every case be borne in mind that the vendor is the
,,'"ronged party and that his injury may not be capable of ac~
curate estimation. Among the factors to be weighed are the
length of the delay, the loss of rents and profits if the vendee has
had possession, the depreciation in value of the land, the removal
of minerals from the land. Matters tending to counterbalance
these are the payment of interest to the vendor and the addition
of valuable improvements of a permanent character. 23
The making of valuable improvements by the vendee very con-
siderably complicates the situation. It may neither be just to
allow them to go to the vendor as a forfeiture for the vendee's
breach nor to enable the defaulting vendee to compel the vendor
to pay for improvements "that he ,vould not himself have made.
In such a case, if the vendor is unwilling to pay for the improve-
ments, the court may order a sale of the land with its improve-
ments, paying the vendor in full and the balance if any to the
vendee.24
22 Sherburne v. Hirst, 121 Fed. 998 (C. C. D. Ore. 1903) ; Pierce v. Staub,
supra note 3; Biddle v. Biddle, 202 Mich. 160, 168 N. W. 92 (1918); Becker
v. Rothschild, 141 N. Y. Supp. 528 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1913); Taylor v.
Kelley, 56 N. C..240 (1857); Graham v. Lebanon, 240 Pa. 337, 87 Atl. 567
(1913); Burchfield v. Hageman, 35 S. D. 147, 151 N. W. 47 (1915); Malm-
berg v. Baugh, supra note 3 (restitution of instalments allowed beyond
compensatory damages to the vendor, which included depreciation in value
of the land, rental value, and interest). In Cornwall v. Henson, [1900]
2 Ch. 298, the vendee paid all but a last small instalment. As to that he
was in default for nearly three years, and he departed from the premises
for nearly two years. Meantime, the vendor resumed possession and leased
to a tenant. The vendee then reappeared and tendered full payment. The
contract provided that for thirty days' default the vendor might resell,
pay himself the unpaid balance due, and pay any excess to the vendee.
It was held that the vendor had committed a breach, the vendee not having
repudiated, and that the vendee had a right to damages therefor.
23 See Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694 (1913),
where matters such as these were taken into consideration in granting
statutory relief to a vendee against the forfeiture of his payments.
24 "This does not lead to the conclusion that the vendor can be compelled
to pay for costly changes which he did not order and does not desire, and
which, though valuable, are not of a character useful to him. Such a result
is obviated by the terms of the decree. If the vendor elects to take back
the land, he must return the purchase money, less damages and rent. If
the land has been improved, he mu'st allow the vendee for the enhancement
in value occasioned thereby, before he can take the land thus improved.
But the vendee cannot force the vendor to pay for the building or other
meliorations. \Vhen the vendee asks compensation therefor, another factor
is injected into the case, whereby he loses the absolute right to the purchase
money, and forces an accounting under which he can secure only what
legally comes to him on a sale of the property, The rights of the parties
must be adjusted, and, upon the vendor's paying the vendee what is equit-
ably due for improvements and return of purchase money, the vendor has
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Where the payments made prior to the default are large in
proportion to the whole price, and are therefore likely to be in
excess of any injury to the vendor, the court has in some cases
been astute to find a ""vaiver" by the vendor.25 His continuing
to receive delayed payments, his express extension of time, or his
statement that payment on time will not be required so as to
prevent a forfeiture, may not prevent the vendee's delay in per-
formance from being a. breach; but they will prevent it from
going "to the essence" and operating to discharge the contractual
duty of the vendor. In such a case the latter's refusal to convey
will itself be a breach, for ,vhich the vendee can get restitution,
as an alternative remedy with damages. 26
If the amount paid by the plaintiff to the defendant is merely
the agreed price of an option to buy or to sell, good for a defi-
nitely specified period, the option-holder certainly has no right to
restitution of this price in case he fails to exercise his power
within the period of its life. The amount so paid by him is
neither a penalty nor liquidated damages; it is the price of a
valuable power, good for a particular period, and at the end of
that period the option-holder has received the full equivalent of
his money. There is no failure of consideration or unjust enrich-
ment if he fails to exercise his power before it expires.27
the option to take the land under the terms of the rescinded contract. If
he does not desire to exercise this option, the property should be sold, the
proceeds should be first applied to the payment of what is due the vendor,
and the balance should be paid over to the vendee. In this way the rights
of both parties are fully preserved." Lytle v. Scottish-American Mortg.
Co., supra note 6, at 470, 50 S. E. at 407.
25 Walker v. Burtless, 82 Neb. 211, 214, 117 N. W. 349, "350, 118 N. W.
113 (1908): "By the terms of the agreement a forfeiture is to be declared
under certain conditions. The forfeiture clause must be construed strictly
against defendant, and if she did not declare a forfeiture, she was not, and
is not, entitled to retain said money." See also Curtis v. Factory Site Co.,
12 Ohio App. 148 (1919).
26 Hayt v. Bentel, 164 Cal. 680, 684, 130 Pac. 432, 433 (1913) ($600 paid
on a total of $825): "But this undoubtedly sound doctrine does not apply
to a case where the vendor has waived the delay in making payments. . . .
The waiver of the right to insist upon prompt payment is established by
the acceptance of a part of the final installment long after it was due."
See also King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho 223, 118 Pac. 292 (1911) (waiver here
by a· contractual rescission); Graham v. Merchant, 43 Ore. 294, 72 Pac.
1088 (1903) ($29,544 paid, out of total of $40,000); Lowenstein v. Arm-
strong, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 543 (1905) (vendee found not in default because
vendor had not tendered conveyance) ; Burchfield v. Hageman, 35 S. D. 147,
151 N. W. 47 (1915); Spedden v. Sykes, 51 Wash. 267, 98 Pac. 752 (1908)
($5,000 paid on total of $20,000); Whiting v. Doughton, 31 Wash. 327, 71
Pac. 1026 (1903) ($220 paid, total of $275, and improvements made).
27 See Torrey v. McFadyen, 165 N. C. 237, 81 S. E. 296 (1914).
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FORFEITURE PROVISION DISTINGUISHED FROM A GENUINE LIQUIDA-
TION OF DAMAGES
An express provIsIon in a contract for the sale of land or
chattels that time shall be of the essence and that in case of non-
payment of any instalment at the time specified all previous
instalments (and not merely a first instalment or other definite
amount) may be retained by the vendor as liquidated damages,
ought to be held to be a penalty provision and, therefore, unen-
forceable. 28 Indeed, there are some very well-considered cases
in which the court has held that in spite of such an express provi-
sion the vendee can recover the instalments already paid, less
damages for the injury that his breach has caused to the ven-
dor; 29 in some of them, the decision was rested upon a supposed
"rescission" by the vendor: Many other cases have held the con-
trary; but most of them, as has been indicated previously, can be
explained on other and better grounds-as that the vendor still
28 In Malmberg v. Baugh, supra note 3, at 345, 218 Pac. at 980, the court
clearly recognized the penalty element in such an agreement. The contract
in this case contained no express prQvision for a forfeiture of instalments
paid, but it did provide for the return of the deed of conveyance to the
vendor by the party to whom it had been delivered in escrow. The court
said: "The rule contended for by respondent, carried to its logical sequence,
would forfeit every dollar paid by appellants and still leave respondents
in possession of the land even if appellants had paid the last instalment
but one, and then defaulted.... A rule that admits of such oppression
and hardship is unjust and inequitable. It ought not to be enforced in a
court of justice whenever the damages exceed an adequate and just com-
pensation for th~ wrong complained of." In the case of In re Dagenham
Dock Co., L. R. 8 Ch. App. 1022, 1025 (1873), it was said by Mellish, L. J.:
"1 have always understood that where there is a stipulation that if, on a
certain day, an agreement remain either wholly or in any part unperformed
-in which case the real damage may be either very large or very trifling
-there is to be a certain forfeiture incurred, that stipulation is to be
treated as in the nature of a penalty."
29 Sherburne v. Hirst, supra note 22; Lytle v. Scottish-Amer. Mortg. Co.,
supra note 6; Brown v. Verzani, 181 Iowa 237, 164 N. W. 601 (1917);
Waters v. Pearson, 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. W. 1026 (1914); Horse Shoe
Mining Co. v. Red RoseL. & Z. Mining Co., 104 Okla. 45, 230 Pac. 492
(1924); Steedman v. Drinkle, [1916] 1 A. C. 275; Brown v. Walsh, 45
Dnt. L. R. 646 (1919). In Troughton v. Eakle, 58 Cal. App. 161, 208 Pac.
161 (1922), the court took notice of a code provision (CAL. CIV. CODE,
§ 3275) with regard to relief from forfeitures and permitted the vendee
to amend his petition so as to bring his claim for restitution within the
terms of the statute. This code provision has not been referred to in many
of the California cases involving restitution of payments. See (1930) 18
CALIF. L. REV. 681. See also Fickbohm v. Knaust, 61 Cal. App. 369, 284
Pac. 692 (1930). In Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, supra note 23, restitu-
tion was granted in spite of an express forfeiture on the basis of § 6039
of the Revised Code. In Sabas v. Gregory, 91 Conn. 26, 98 Atl. 293 (1916),
the buyer was given judgment for the excess of payments over injury,
nothing being said as to penalties or liquidated damages.
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has a right to full specific performance, or that tIle vendor's
injury is not shown to be less than the instahnents paid.30
Cases of this sort have one important difference from cases in
which a party promises to pay a specified sum as liquidated
damages in case of a future breach. It is the difference bet\veen
an agreement that a vendor sllall be privileged to keep ,vhat he
has already received and an executory promise creating in the
vendor a right that money shall be paid to him. It is the differ-
ence between the executed and the executory, between possession
and the hope to possess, bet\\reen a bird in tIle hand and a bird
in the bush. Here it may be that possession is nine points in the
law. It is little less harsh on the vendee that the vendor may
keep sums already paid ,vhen they are in excess of injury suf-
fered than to compel him to pay a sum not yet paid, if ,ve con-
sider the fact that the agreed exchange for those sums is not
going to be performed.:n But there are sometimes substantial
reasons for letting a vendor keep instalments already paid that
are not applicable to the enforcelnent of an executory promise to
pay. The instalments, \vhen paid, come to him as his O\Vll, and
he is justified in making investments and expenditures in accord-
ance therewith. Nevertheless, in the absence of an~ proof of
such a justified change of position involving an impossibility of
restoring the former status quo, the vendor should not be allo\ved
to keep, by way of penalty or forfeiture~ that which he would not
be allowed to recover if it had not yet been paid. Possession
itself should not be nine points in law, even though in some
instances changes of position may mount up as high as ten
points. The injured party should be given full compensation,
and no more; and he should be required to trust a disinterested
court to determine its amount, rather than to make use of his
economic power in advance not only to drive a hard bargain, but
also to determine the penalty for breach.
That such contracts do, in fact, provide for a penalty in place
of just compensation cannot be doubted. In most such instances
the breach consists of the mere non-payment of money at the
time specified; and the amount of the forfeiture increases as per-
formance proceeds, so that the penalty grows larger as the
breach grows smaller.32 A provision that time shall be of the
essence is in itself harsh enough, as is indicated by the fact that
equity (now the prevailing law) would practically never make
it of the essence in the absence of an express provision. Under
30 See Stennick v. Jones, 252 Fed. 345 (C.C.A. 9th, 1918), where the
injury was greater in amount than the forfeiture.
3! See Malmberg v. Baugh, supra note 3.
82 This is expressly recognized in Chace v. Johnson, 98 Fla. 118, 123 So.
519 (1929); Davis v. Freeman, 10 Mich. 188 (1862); Kilmer v. British
Col. Orchard Lands, [1913] A. C. 319. And see the similar dictum in Union
Pacific Ry. v. Mitchell-Crittenden Tie Co., 190 Fed. 544 (C.C.A. 8th, 1911).
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such a provision, failure by the vendee to make a payment on
time deprives him of his right to the promised conveyance; and
he cannot compel a specific conveyance by the vendor,33 at least
in the absence of circumstances of great hardship.34 But the
very fact that it often seems harsh to deprive the vendee of his
contract right to a conveyance because of a mere delay in pay-
ment and that the performance of an express condition precedent
is sometimes excused .because of impossibility or extreme diffi-
culty, a, fortiori indicates the injustice of permitting the vendor
to keep an outrageous penalty merely because he has collected
it in advance. Indeed, there are good cases holding that a vendee
who fails to pay as agreed can get a decree for specific perform-
ance by the vendor, in spite of an express provision for forfei-
ture, if payments or improvements have been made greatly in
excess of any injury to the vendor.35
The cases no\v under discussion differ also from those in which
a party makes a deposit as security for performance, to be for-
feited in case of his default; but the difference is somewhat less
than that just considered above. The instalments paid by a
vendee are paid as part of a promised performance and go to the
vendor for llis own use as he may see fit. The deposit is put into
his possession merely as security; and he is not privileged to use
it in making investments or expenditures. In such a case, he is
not permitted to keep it all if it operates as a penalty instead of
just compensation for injury suffered. Here possession as se-
curity only is not nine points in the law. While these cases can
be distinguished from those providing for retention of all ad-
vance instalments, it is believed that the same result should be
reached, in the absence of a change of position by the vendor,
as suggested above.
The express provisio11 for retention of money by the vendor
-- -------------- ---
33 Smith v. Berkau, 123 Ark. 90, 184 S. W. 429 (1916); Andrews v. Karl,
42 Cal. App. 513, 183 Pac. 838 (1919); Brickles v. Snell, [1916] 2 A. C.
599; Steedman v. Drinkle, [1916] 1 A. C. 275. Contra, if hardship, Leak
v. Colburn, 55 Cal. App. 784, 204 Pac. 249 (1922).
34 A vendor who brings a bill to quiet title or for some other equitable
remedy may be denied the relief asked except on such terms as would
nullify an express forfeiture of instalments paid. See W itherstine v.
Snyder, 225 Ill. App. 189 (1922).
35 Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 498 (1890) (sernble);
Steele v. Branch, 40 Cal. 3 (1870) (sentble); Haas v. Coburn, 22 Idaho
47, 124 Pac. 476 (1912); Jones v. Robbins, 29 Me. 351 (1849); Richmond
v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193 (1864); Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige 352
(N. Y. 1844); Kilmer v. British Col. Orchard Lands, [1913] A. C. 319;
Vernon v. Stephens, 2 P. Wms. 66 (1722); AMES. Ope cit. supra note 4, at
339n. Contra: Fresno lrr. Farms Co. v. Canupis, 39 Cal. App. 184, 178
Pac. 300 (1918); Heckard v. Sayre, 34 Ill. 142 (1874); Pickens v. Campbell,
104 Kan. 425, 179 Pac. 343 (1919); Missouri River Fort Scott & Gulf, ~c.
R. R. v. Brickley, 21 Kan. 275 (1878); AMES, Ope cit. supra note 4, at 341.
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may in some cases properly be held to be one for liquidated
damages. This may be so, irrespective of the \vords used in the
co~tract. It is not conclusive for or against a party that the
contract describes the amount as a penalty, a forfeiture, or
liquidated damages. If the provision is merely for the retention
of a comparatively small sum paid as earnest money or as a first
instalment, and not for the retention of all instalments that may
have been paid, few or many, large or small, it should usually
be held to be a genuine provision for liquidated damages, the
actual injury being uncertain and difficult to estimate and the
amount not being unreasonable or disproportionate to the total
values involved.56 In such a case the vendor may retain the
amount specified as liquidated damages; but he must return all
other instalments if lle wishes to retain the land itself.31
CONDITIONAL SALE OF GOODS COMPARED
Similar problems have arisen in the case of conditional sales of
goods. Formal title is reserved as security for payment of the
price. The contract sometimes expressly provides for forfeiture
of payments in case of a default and sometimes does not. The
common law courts generally enforced a forfejture in these cases,
sometimes suggesting that the buyer might have relief in equity.
There were numerous cases, however~ that permitted the buyer
36 Public Inqustrials Corp. v. Reading Hdw. Co., 29 F. (2d) 975 (C.C.A.
3d 1929) ($300,000 down payment, forfeited as "liquidated damages," the
total price being $3,900,000); Walbridge v. Richards, 290 Pac. 304 (Cal.
App. 1930) (deposit of $1,000 on a $15,000 contract); Poheim v. Meyers,
9 Cal. App. 31, 98 Pac. 65 (1908) (deposit of $500 on a $14,625 contract) ;
Wolf v. Lake, 17'8 Ill. App. 340 (1913) ($150 paid as "earnest money" on
a $6,900 contract); Garcin v. Pennsylvania Furnace Co., 186 Mass. 405,
71 N. E. 793 (1904); First Nat. Bank of Garfield v. Dressler, 100 N.J.Eq.
381, 136 Atl. 417 (1927); Moore v. Durnam, 63 N.J~Eq. 96, 51 Atl. 449
(1902); Feldman v. Reliant Holding Co., 129 N.Y.Supp. 504 (Sup. Ct.
1911) ($1,000 deposit paid on a $95,000 contract, the $1,000 "to be returned
to plaintiff when the plaintiff complied with all the requirements of the
contract"); Roth v. Goodman, 52 Misc. 509, 102 N.Y.Supp. 683 (Sup. Ct.
1907) ($200 paid as a deposit on a $46,500 contract); Goldman v. Willis,
64 App. Div. 508, 72-N.Y.Supp. 292 (2d Dept. 1901); Lichetti v. Conway,
44 Pa. Super. Ct. 71 (1910) (deposit of $500 on a $33,000 contract) ; Joyce
v.Hagelstein, 163 S. W. 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) ($500 paid as "earnest
money" on a contract of over $8,000); '\Voodman v. Blue Grass Land Co.,
supra note 10 ($1,000 "earnest money" on a $31,500 contract). In Sher-
burne v. Hirst, supra note 22, under the existing circumstances, even a
provision of this kind was held to be for a penalty and was not enforced.
31 Artzerounian v. Demetriades, 276 Pa. 303, 120 Atl. 142 (1923) (first
instalment of $1,000 retained, other instalments ordered repaid). If the
amount is not a true liquidation of damages, it will not govern the amount
to be retain ~d. Addftional instalments may be retained to the full extent
of injury actually suffered. See McCain v. Hicks, 150 La. 43, 90 So. 506
(1922) .
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to recover money paid, so far as it ,vas in excess of injury, on
the theory that tllere had been a rescission of the contract by the
seller. Just as in the land cases, "rescission" is here a slippery
,v'ord, usually meaning nothing except that the seller has exer-
cised his legal privileges as owner by retaking possession of the
goods and has declared his contractual duties at an end.38
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, already adopted in a
number of states,39 fully recognizes that the retention of title is
for security only and contains provisions for the prevention of
an unjust forfeiture. In case of a retaking of the goods by the
seller, the buyer can require their resale and the repayment to
him of any balance remaining after full payment of the contract
price and expenses.40 If the payments already made by the buyer
are small, or the depreciation in value is great, the buyer may
not find it to his interest to require a resale. In such cases, the
forfeiture of his interest in the goods may not operate as a pen-
alty, but may instead be a fair compensation for the seller's
injur~y.
Of course, the seller should in no case be deprived of his pro-
tection against loss and his security for the price. There is
greater reason for this in the case of a sale of goods than in that
of a sale of land. Goods generally depreciate much more rapidly
than does land.41 Therefore, if it is just and equitable for the
buyer of goods to have a right of restitution, in spite of his de-
fault and in spite of an express provision for forfeiture, this is
even more certainly true in the case of the vendee of land.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The cases denying restitution can, in the light of the preceding
discussion, be justified on one or more of the following grounds:
33 The cases dealing with the subject matter of this paragraph are col-
lected and discussed by Bogert, in his Commentaries on Cmulitional Sales
2A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED-§§ 113-115, 130-132.
39 Alaska (1919), Arizona (1919), Delaware (1919), New Jersey (1919),
New York (1922), Pennsylvania (1925), South Dakota (1919), West Vir-
ginia (1925), Wisconsin (1919). The New York Personal Property Law,
§ 65, had previously contained similar provisions. See Bogert, op. cit..
Bupra note 38, at § 132.
40 The Act, §§ 18-23, provides for redemption after default, just as in
the case of land and chattel mortgages. Bogert says that lithe provisions
for redemption under the Uniform Act are believed to follow very closely
the statutory or equitable provisions established before the Uniform Act."
Op, cit. supra note 38, at 157. The provision for repayment to the buyer
of the excess over the price and expenses received on resale of the goods
does not follow previously existing common law, although there is some
indication that equity was developing a similar form of relief.
41 The depreciation of a chattel sold and in use may be very rapid; and
there are times when even land rapidly declines in value. That this gen-
erally justifies the retention of instalments on an automobile, see SELIGMAN,
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALMENT SELLING (1927) 61.
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(1) The defendant has not rescinded a11d remains ready and
willing to perform, and still has a right to specific performance
by the vendee; (2) the plaintiff has not shown that the injury
caused by his breach is less than the instalments received by the
defendant; (3) there is an express provision that the money may
be retained by the vendor and the facts are such as to make this
a genuine provision for liquidated damages, and not one for a
penalty or forfeiture. 42 If the facts are such that none of these
justifications exists, restitution should be allowed.
42 If the express provision is held to be for a penalty or forfeiture, it does
not determine the damages recoverable by the vendor and does not prevent
restitution to the vendee; but the vendee may still be denied restitution on
either of grounds (1) and (2).
